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Abstract
This paper examines the recent U.S.-Russian trade dispute over poultry meat exports. 
Russia embargoed U.S. poultry on February 16, 1996, alleging that the U.S. inspection system did
not meet Russian standards.  An agreement signed on March 25, 1996, establishing an inspection
criteria for exports to Russia and a testing protocol for salmonella and residues, resolved the trade
dispute.   Analysis indicates that Arkansas leg quarters prices are closely linked to U.S. poultry
exports to Russia. 
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Non-Tariff Barriers and Political Solutions to Trade Disputes:  
A Case Study of U.S. Poultry Exports to Russia
1
A trade dispute in 1996 threatened U.S. poultry exports to Russia, our fastest growing
market.  The rapid rise in Russian poultry meat imports is attributed to supply problems in Russia
and differences in consumer tastes and preferences between the U.S. and Eastern Europe.  The
decline in Russian food production is well documented (Liefert, 1996; Braun 1996).   In the last
five years, Russian grain production has fallen 46%, sugar production 41%, dairy production
about 29%, and overall agricultural production 33%.  Between 1991 and 1996, poultry meat
output dropped by 44%  (Maillet, 1996, p. 1).  Russian integrated poultry operations are working
at about 50% capacity (RUSAG-L, Deptember 16, 1997, #91).  Imported food now accounts for
40% of all food consumed by Russians - in Moscow and St. Petersburg the figure is 80%
(RUSAG-L, Feb. 4, 1997).  Given such drastic declines in Russian food self-sufficiency,  Russian
concern over the market share captured by imports is understandable.  
In 1996, the Russian Federation Council’s Agrarian Policy Committee proposed quotas on
basic foods rather than tariffs to control food imports.  In addition, conservative members of the
Agrarian Party advocate the creation of a state monopoly on major food groups.  The growing
uneasiness of Russian officials over the country’s increasing dependence on food imports was a
contributing factor to the subsequent poultry meat import embargo of 1996.  Food imports
antagonize some Russian producers and fuel nationalist and conservative forces in Russia who see2
the market economy as serving the interests of the West and destroying Russia’s domestic
industry (Maillet, 1996, p. 1).
The objectives of this case study are: (1) to review the history of the U.S.-Russian poultry
trade dispute, (2) to analyze the dispute settlement procedures, summarizing implications for
meeting the marketing challenges in transition economies of Central Europe and the Newly
Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, and (3) to estimate the impact of the Russian
embargo on Arkansas leg quarter prices.
The U.S.-Russian Poultry Trade Dispute Background
The causes of the Russian poultry meat embargo include: (1) allegations of subsidized
exports, (2) Russia’s attempts to protect its domestic industry, (3) technical problems in a few
U.S. export shipments to the country, and (4) a host of other problems, mainly political. 
The success of U.S. poultry exports to Russia may have contributed to the protectionist
measures in the Russian market.  U.S. poultry exports to Russia have increased 253% in the last
three years, to $912 million in 1996, making Russia the largest export market for American
poultry (Table 1).  American poultry accounted for over 75% of all poultry imported by Russia in
1995-96.   “Poultry exports accounted for over 20% of all U.S. exports to Russia . . . Many
Russian economists believe that the American chicken can only be sold as cheaply as it is in
Russia -- undercutting domestic competitors -- because of ‘covert export subsidies’” (Maillet,
1996, p. 1).   
The rapid growth in frozen poultry exports to Russia began during the Bush
Administration when the U.S. provided loan guarantees to American exporters to stimulate the
sale of dark meat to Russia (Gordon, Feb. 24, 1996, p. 33).   Between 1991 and 1994, the3
Commodity Credit Corporation provided $59.8 million in loan guarantees under GSM-102, the
short-term Export Credit Guarantee Program covering 62,579 metric tons of frozen poultry to
Russia (USDA, FAS, 1991-94).   Export credit guarantees only covered 50% of the shipments
during the 1991-92 years of Russian market development.  In 1993 and 1994, export credit
guarantees covered only 3% of poultry exports to Russia.  No export credit guarantees were used
since 1994.  Thus, export credit guarantees were only instrumental in risk reduction in the first
few years of the Russian market development (Gordon, January 18, 1996, p. 1D).  Moreover,
direct export subsidies for poultry meat under the Export Enhancement Program were not used in
the Russian market in the 1990s.  
The debate in Russia became heated as some Russian officials accused the U.S. of trying
to destroy the Russian poultry industry (Maillet, 1996, p. 2).   American poultry is generally less
expensive than most other meats in Russia.  In February 1996, American chicken was selling for
about R9,000 per kilogram ($1.83/kg or $0.83/lb retail) in Russia while European chicken sold
for R25,000 and Russian chicken ranged from R10,000 to R13,000 per kilogram (Maillet, 1996,
p. 2).  Thus, American poultry sold for 29% less than Russian poultry prior to the embargo.
Differences in tastes and preferences between U.S. and Russian consumers also fueled the
surge in import demand for poultry meat.  U.S. consumers generally prefer white breast meat for
ready to prepare meals (Gordon, January 18, 1996, p. 1D; Maillet, May 1, 1996).  Russian
consumers developed a taste for dark meat, legs and thighs.   Quality differences were also
important, “Russian chicken is generally poor quality, with even breast meat stringy and
unappealing.  That’s one reason dark meat is more popular; the other is that it has a stronger
flavor and can be used in soup,” (Pierce, 1996, p. 68).  The supply of dark meat in the U.S. found4
a ready outlet in the Russian market as domestic supplies declined and the cost of production rose
with the removal of production subsidies.  “Russian . . . processors have to make 10,000 rubles a
kilogram (about $2.10) to break even.  Imported chicken has been going for 8,500 rubles (about
$1.80) in Moscow and other cities,” (Pierce, 1996, p. 68).
The “chicken war” had been expected for some time.  In an attempt to reduce imports and
raise revenue, customs duties on food imports into Russia were initiated in 1994.  Despite higher
import taxes, American poultry exports to Russia continued to increase.  Duties were increased in
1995, but these tariffs still did not reduce imports.  The industry alleges that Russian tariffs were
never really collected, at least until just recently (Sumner, 1997).
The critical factors in triggering the 1996 embargo incident appear to be technical
problems related to an apparent breakdown in export shipment and food safety requirements
(Sumner, 1996, p. 4).  Poultry products intended for the U.S. fresh chilled domestic market may
have been inadvertently shipped in the export market without special attention to refrigeration
requirements.  As Gordon, (1996 p. 33) states:  “Russian officials turned to the Ministry of
Agriculture and the threat of more rigorous health checks.  In fact, Russian inspectors toured U.S.
poultry farms and slaughter houses in January [1996] and supposedly found serious violations of
Russian veterinary requirements.  The U.S. completely disagreed with the results of their
inspection.  A shipment of spoiled chicken from ConAgra in late 1995 seems to have served as the
basis for the more recent claims of unsafe food imports.”  In this case, it is apparent that slippages
in quality control resulted in adverse consequences for the entire industry.  Not all of the food
safety problems can be attributed to lax quality control by the American poultry industry.  In the
early market development phase, Russian distributors experienced some setbacks handling frozen5
imported product.  “Some chicken spoiled when the Russian buyer failed to manage the cargo
properly,” (Gordon, January 18, 1997, p. 1D).
The Winter Crisis 1996
When the dispute over quality control in exports shipments arose in late 1995, Russian
agriculture ministry officials complained that they were not satisfied with the safety of U.S.
poultry meat nor about the effectiveness of the U.S. inspection system.  In response to Russian
concerns about U.S. poultry processing conditions, 400 poultry processors doing business in
Russia provided $600,000 to pay for five Russian veterinary groups to tour U.S. processing
facilities.  The tours began in mid-January 1996, and were scheduled to be completed in April 8,
1996 (Stewart, March 20, 1996, p. 1C).  Prior to the completion of the Russian tours of U.S.
facilities, the embargo of poultry imports into Russian erupted on February 16, 1996.  
When reports surfaced that some facilities did not meet Russian inspectors approval, U.S.
Secretary of Agriculture, Dan Glickman, immediately responded by stating that the U.S. agreed in
no way with the inspection results (Stewart, 1996, p. 1D).  In fact, the president of the U.S.
Poultry & Egg Export Council, Jim Sumner, stated "I'm told the primary reason for plants not
being approved is simply lack of preparation for the inspection: records not being made available,
for instance" (Stewart, 1996, p. 1A).  Here again, with such allegations, the U.S. believed that
Russia was simply worried about becoming too reliant on food imports.  
The flash point of this dispute began on February 16, 1996, when the Russians stopped
issuing import licenses for poultry meat from the U.S.  This change in policy signaled a dramatic
shift in Russian import regulations. 6
The Poultry Trade Dispute Settlement Process
In an attempt to resolve the poultry trade dispute, Vice President Al Gore invited a
delegation of Russian negotiators to Washington in mid-March 1996.  Dr. Vyacheslav Avilov of
the Russian Ministry of Agriculture’s Veterinary Inspection Service led the delegation (Blustein,
March 19, 1996, p. C02).  The final trade negotiations were held under the auspices of the U.S.
Trade Representative (USTR) in Washington. 
The resolution of the poultry trade dispute involved a wide range of federal agencies, the
Office of Vice President Al Gore, U.S. senators, poultry industry associations, and private
companies representing poultry producers and exporters.  Dr. Vyacheslav Avilov of the Russian
Veterinary Service conducted negotiations for the importers. Cathy Novelli, European Desk
Officer at USTR headed the U.S. negotiating effort along with representatives of  the U.S.
Department of Agriculture.  The USTR which represents the Executive Branch in trade
negotiations and the Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) led
by Tom Billy, Deputy Administer, were central to the negotiations because the dispute involved
allegations of inadequate food safety standards in poultry processing, shipping and exporting to
Russia. 
The negotiators reflected an effective liaison between the poultry industry, its associations,
and the federal government. Early in the process, Secretary of Agriculture, Dan Glickman,
appointed John Reddington, Director of the Dairy, Livestock and Poultry Division of USDA's
Foreign Agricultural Service, as the task force coordinator.  Mr. Reddington brought together the
interested parties to resolve the technical issues involved in the final agreement (Sumner 1996, p.
13).7
Important political catalysts in the negotiating process included Vice President Al Gore,
39 U.S. Senators who urged resolution of the dispute on behalf of constituents, and industry
associations such as the USA Poultry & Egg Export Council, the National Broiler Council, and
the National Turkey Federation.  U.S. poultry export companies provided technical information to
the USTR and FSIS regarding the impact of changes in the food safety and inspection
requirements on the industry.      
Considerable political capital was expended in resolving the poultry dispute. The good
relationships between Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin
played a key role. The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, established in 1993 at the Vancouver
Summit, has nine committees, including one on agricultural business, which meet twice a year. 
The Commission fosters communications between the Vice President and the Prime Minister and
their respective government agencies.  Gore and Chernomyrdin remained in close contact
throughout the negotiations.  Other evidence indicates considerable political pressure was also
brought to bear on the negotiations.
Senator William V. Roth (R-Del), chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, argued in a
letter to U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor that the U.S. response to the embargo should
be forceful. Senator Roth alluded to retaliatory measures. These included retaliation under Section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974 against imports of Russian products in the U.S., a freeze on U.S.
Export-Import Bank loans and credits for the Russian aircraft industry, and suspension of U.S. aid
and assistance programs for Russia.  Finally, Roth urged the administration to reconsider its
support for the $10.2 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (International Trade8
Reporter Mar., 6, 1996, p. 384). Thus, a lot of political pressure was applied on both sides to
resolve the poultry dispute. 
Final Agreement on Resuming Poultry Exports to Russia
The comprehensive agreement, signed on March 25, 1996, between the FSIS and the chief
Russian veterinarian Dr. V. Avilov, "...essentially re-confirms existing inspection criteria for
exporting U.S. product to Russia and establishes a testing protocol for salmonella and residues"
(U.S. Poultry & Egg Exporter 1996, p. 10). Disease free certification of U.S. poultry flocks,
residue testing and salmonella testing had been the primary demands of the Russian Veterinary
Service all along for the resumption of import certificates. 
U.S. and Russian agreement provides for (1) the Department of Agriculture to issue new
certificates verifying that U.S. poultry shipments to Russia meet Russian veterinary health
requirements,  (2) Russia, meanwhile, agreed to begin issuing new import licences to U.S. poultry
exporters, and (3) under the accord, U.S. and Russian officials agreed to jointly inspect U.S.
plants that produce poultry for the Russian market to ensure compliance with Russian standards. 
These inspections involve spot-checks of some 40 plants annually, or about 10% of those plants
exporting poultry to Russia.  The new procedures require that new U.S. certificates, verifying that
U.S. poultry meets Russian veterinary health requirements, must accompany each shipment of
U.S. poultry to Russia.  The U.S. also agreed to provide a new bilingual inspection certificate
from the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) and USDA agreed to certify that poultry
meat exports for further processing come from flocks free of six specific diseases.
Under the new certificate program, poultry meat exports must be tested for pesticides,
antibiotics and heavy metal salts.  In addition, each consignment must be tested for all types of9
salmonella and certified salmonella-free.  Mechanically deboned meat and ground poultry meat
must come from carcasses that test negative for salmonella and must be labeled in Russian, for
further industrial processing only.  Processor plant and cold storage facilities must be in
compliance with USDA regulations and pass Russian inspection (U.S. Poultry and Egg Exporter,
Spring 1996, p. 10).  
A side agreement was approved at the last moment which allowed for the testing and
shipment of 60,000 to 80,000 metric tons of frozen poultry meat in U.S. storage to Russia
(Sumner, 1996, p. 14).  If this volume of product were sold in the U.S., it would depress U.S.
prices drastically.
In another side agreement, the U.S. industry agreed to invest in a failed Russian poultry
operation to convert it into a world class production facility.  The U.S. industry agreed to finance
the project at a cost of several million dollars (Brown, 1997, p. 4).  The joint venture to produce
broilers in Russia will be under the direction of the Executive Committee of the U.S. Poultry and
Egg Export Council, a poultry trade association (Brown, 1997, p. 3).  Industry sources believe
that U.S. market access will be more secure if there is a balance between imported poultry and
domestic production.  The vertically integrated production and processing complex will be self-
supporting and includes a training facility for technology and information transfer.
Impact on U.S. Industry
The profitability of the U.S. broiler industry is becoming increasingly dependent on the
export market.  Monthly chicken part exports to Russia dropped from 261 million pounds to 73
million pounds between February and March, 1996 (Figure 1).  U.S. leg quarter prices and
exports to Russia are highly correlated according to analysts at the Foreign Agricultural Service. 10
“Nearly 65% of the price variability in Arkansas leg quarter prices can be linked to broiler
shipments to Russia (USDA, FAS, 1996, p. 79).  This basic analysis has been expanded to include
the one-time embargo effect plus the collection of tariff changes in late 1996.  
Model Specification and Data
The demand for U.S. farm products in the 1990s is closely tied to the export market.  In
the case of the exports, impediments to normal trade flows can create substantial fluctuations in
price.  These trade distortions include tariffs, quotas, embargoes, and non-tariff barriers.  In the
case of poultry meat exports, the Russian market dominates U.S. sales, accounting for an
estimated 40% of U.S. exports.  Any disruptions in the Russian import market would be expected
to have an impact on the U.S. price (Figure 2).
The price of Arkansas leg quarters (4/10 pack) was specified as a function of monthly
exports to Russia, a trend variable, and two dummy variables to account for the import embargo
of U.S. poultry in February, 1996, and the resumption of tariff collection on poultry meat in
November 1996.
The general form of the equation is as follows:
P, = f(Q, D , D  T) (1) t    t  1  2,
where P represents the price per pound of Arkansas leg quarters, (4/10 pack of leg quarters, fob
shippers dock), the monthly exports of frozen broiler meat to Russia (Q), a dummy variable D  for 1
the Russian import embargo (1 for Feb., Mar., and April 1996, 0 otherwise), a dummy variable D2
for the implementation of tariff collection in Russia (1 for November, 1996 through October,
1997, 0 otherwise), and T a trend factor.  In November, 1996, the Russian customs service began11
collecting a 30% import tariff on all poultry meat entering the country.  Both trade policies, the
embargo and the tariff, were expected to have a negative impact on leg quarter prices in the U.S.
Data on monthly U.S. broiler exports to Russia were obtained from the U.S. Department
of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service.  Arkansas leg quarter prices were obtained from
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Poultry Market News.
A log-log function was used to estimate the impact of monthly exports to Russia on the
Arkansas leg quarters prices as specified in equation 1.
LN(P) = ￿  + ￿  LN(Q) + ￿  D +  ￿ D +  ￿ T + U  (2) t   0   1   t  2   1   3   2   4    t
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) was employed to estimate equation parameters.
Results and Interpretations
Results of the OLS of Arkansas leg quarter prices are presented in Table 2.  Since the log-
log function was used in the estimation, the coefficient of the quantity variable represents the price
response with respect to the quantity exported.  
As expected, the monthly quantity exported to Russia was positively associated with
Arkansas leg quarters prices.  The coefficient was significant at the ￿=0.03 level.  The coefficient
of dummy variable representing the implementation of the embargo was negative as expected
since a cutoff of the export market placed additional supplies on the domestic market which
would reduce prices.  The coefficient was statistically significant at the ￿=0.01 level.  The
coefficient of the dummy variable representing the collection of the tariffs on imported poultry
would also reduce leg quarter prices since exporting firms would be paying the levy to the
Russian customs service.  Tariff collection would reduce the expected price of leg quarters.  The
coefficient was statistically significant at ￿=0.0001 level.  The coefficient of the trend variable was12
positive and significant at ￿=0.0001 level.  Leg quarter prices have been increasing over the
period of analysis partially due to exports.  The adjusted R-square was 0.7662 indicating that 77%
of the variability in the monthly price of Arkansas leg quarters explained by the model.
Conclusions
The results of this study clearly indicates how dependent the U.S. market is on exports
and how changes in the international market can impact prices and profits in the domestic market. 
Since 1991 poultry exports to Russia have grown from zero to 40% of U.S. poultry exports
worth $912 million in 1996.  This phenomenal growth led to the Russian embargo of February
1996 when allegedly quality control in a shipment of poultry meat triggered the Russian embargo
of U.S. poultry imports.  The resolution of the trade dispute required the combined efforts of U.S.
processors, trade associations, the U.S. Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), and Vice
President Gore’s Office.  Subsequently, the Russian customs service began collection of tariffs in
late 1996.  These factors - the growth in exports, the embargo, and the tariff collection - had an
impact on Arkansas leg quarter prices.
Leg quarter prices dropped nearly 25% to 32.5 cents per pound in one month as a result
of the embargo.  Prices recovered in mid-1996 to pre-embargo levels and then fell about 18% as
Russian tariff collection began in late 1996.  These factors illustrate how dependence on a single
market can have an adverse impact on domestic prices.  The industry has rebounded from these
problems.  Exports of poultry to Russia reached $404 million in the first six months of 1997, up
about 13% over the previous year.13
Implications for Trade and Marketing in Transition Economies 
The true challenge in this issue is the stability of the Russian market.  The ban on
American poultry meat imports has already been implemented once, and could be again.  Despite
assurances from Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin in early March that the ban would
not be implemented, U.S. chicken was banned from entering Russia on March 16, 1996.  The
Russian Veterinary Service had already stopped issuing new import licences a month earlier.  The
effects of the ban left shipments of poultry stranded in ports and warehouses (Maillet, 1996). 
After the embargo, Russian officials elevated tariff rates again.   Ultimately, in an accord was
negotiated between the USTR’s Office and Russian Negotiations on March 29, 1996, establishing
a 30% ad valorem tariff on five categories of poultry imports (U.S. Poultry and Egg Exporter,
Spring 1996, p. 14).  Moreover, demand for protectionism in Russia remains high because
incentives to increase agricultural production are weak due to ineffective price information
systems, high transaction costs, segmentation of food policy, and poor infrastructure (Braun et al.,
1996, p. 20).  
What can be learned about the most recent round of “chicken wars.”  First, success in
gaining market share may result in a protectionist backlash.  Second, governments are determined
to protect their consumers from unsafe foods.  Moreover, in a market where “natural” foods are
common, consumers are reluctant to risk public and private well being in the consumption of
imported foods not deemed or perceived safe.  Third, carelessness in international trade can have
dire consequences.  Finally, the poultry trade dispute indicates that governments and trade
associations can work together to resolve disputes to the mutual benefit of all concerned, if trust
is established among the contracting parties.14
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Table 1. U.S. Poultry Meat Exports to Russia, 1991-96.
  
                                                          Fiscal Years                                               
 
Item 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
------------------------------------------ $ million -------------------------------------------
Value  65   7  27   258   504   912
------------------------------------1,000 metric tons ---------------------------------------
Quantity  83  22  43   315   625   937
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.  Former USSR Update
Agricultural and Trade Report.  WRS-96-53, October 25, 1996.18
Table 2.  Parameter Estimates for Monthly Arkansas Leg Quarter Prices , 1993 to 1997
1
Coefficient
Variables Estimates t-value Probability
Intercept 3.0201 39.376 0.0001
Monthly Exports
to Russia - LQ 0.0213 2.194 0.0328 t
Russian Embargo - D   -0.1592 -2.748 0.0083 1
Russian Tariff
Collection - D   -0.4425 -9.930 0.0001 2
Trend - T 0.0116 7.762 0.0001
R-Squared 0.7832
F(4, 55) 46.0660
Degrees of Freedom 55
Prices are for Arkansas leg quarters in 4/10 boxes, the primary export packaging form for poultry
cuts. 
 One box contains 4 polybags, each bag holds 10 lbs of leg quarters.  Prices are derived from a
1
processor survey conducted by the Agricultural Marketing Service in Little Rock.